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ABSTRACT 
  In recent years, the federal government’s efforts to open up 
competitive electricity markets have transformed how we think about 
the regulation of energy. In many respects, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) broad “deregulatory” efforts, 
which commenced in the 1990s, might appear to be a case of 
paradigmatic regulatory exit as defined by J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman. 
But our case study of FERC’s restructuring of wholesale electricity 
markets reveals some important institutional features that make exit in 
federalism contexts, and under federal statutory duties, a rich and 
difficult problem. In the context of energy, exit from one regulatory 
sphere can create regulatory gaps. This has led FERC, which largely 
exited the regulation of wholesale electricity rates, to increase regulation 
in other spheres. It has also invited forms of intergovernmental 
exchange, as states have emulated or otherwise responded to FERC’s 
regulatory modifications in the areas in which states have jurisdiction. 
In this sense, the transition to competitive energy supply markets has 
involved constrained exit characterized by a hydraulic back-and-forth 
between regulators and institutions in an effort to ensure that statutory 
duties are fulfilled and other public needs are met.  
  This assessment of regulatory exchange has a prescriptive 
implication: a federal regulator seeking to exit specific forms of 
conventional regulation needs to proactively develop strategies to 
facilitate regulatory exchange, while simultaneously preserving its 
authority over important substantive values related to its regulatory 
mission. Attention to “offsetting” regulations is often necessary to 
ensure that problematic regulatory gaps will not arise. In the energy 
context, these strategies might also include the use of mechanisms that 
give other institutions a voice in implementing exit strategies, as well as 
better ex ante regulatory planning for market enforcement that will 
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continue after partial exit. We argue that it is not only a good strategy 
for federal regulators to recognize this hydraulic feature of exit, but that 
cooperative federalism statutes such as the Federal Power Act often 
require them to do so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A vast body of administrative law scholarship assumes that 
regulations are relatively sticky. Agency officials and staff members 
cling to the issues deemed to be highest priority and zealously guard 
their regulatory turf and the scarce resources associated with it.1 A 
growing subset of the literature focuses on regulatory adaptation and 
dynamism, recognizing that too often there is not enough flexibility for 
the regulatory modifications needed to address changing issues over 
time or to experiment with new regulatory approaches.2 These 
literatures reveal the classic tension between entrenchment and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information 
Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1441 (2008) (“Once established, 
bureaucracies do not surrender power lightly.”); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a 
Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 47 (2014) 
(noting “an agency’s inherent bias in interpreting the independent experts’ analysis in support of 
the regulatory status quo or its agenda”).  
 2. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, 
Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 945 (2005) (noting adaptive management 
scholars’ belief that “agencies . . . can reap the benefits of structured learning over time through 
a systematic program of active experimentation”). 
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certainty on the one hand, and the need for flexibility on the other. 
Professors J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman have identified a 
powerful form of regulatory transition that threatens to upset the 
balance between certainty and flexibility—a transition that they define 
as “exit,” meaning an agency’s reduction or elimination of regulation 
in a particular sphere.3 Their typology of various forms of exit offers 
useful strategies for many regulatory settings.4 Dramatic political shifts 
provide an especially stark reminder of the tension between regulatory 
certainty and flexibility. For example, in the environmental context, 
President Trump quickly announced an intent to withdraw from the 
international Paris Agreement on climate5 and appointed a director of 
the Environmental Protection Agency with an avowed distaste for 
many environmental regulations.6 Although similar sudden reforms 
have occurred in the past,7 recent events such as these remind us of the 
need for better analytical tools to help regulators strike a balance 
between entrenchment and flexibility during times of political and 
policy disruption. 
Few industries in the United States have experienced as much 
disruption over the past 50 years as the electric power sector. It should 
thus not be surprising that one of Ruhl and Salzman’s many 
illustrations of exit comes from energy law; they describe the 
movement to competitive energy markets as a form of “adaptive exit.”8 
This Article accepts the framework of their typology. But it also argues 
that the example of “exit” in energy requires further examination 
before it can produce useful lessons for regulatory exit generally.9 
 
 3. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2015) 
(defining exit as “the intentional, significant reduction in governmental intervention initiated at 
a particular time under specified processes and conditions” (emphasis omitted)). 
 4. Id. at 1316–23.  
 5. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June 1, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statement/statement-president-trump-paris-climate 
-accord [https://perma.cc/276E-D79M].  
 6. Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmental-protection-
agency.html [https://perma.cc./XH45-BFVY]. 
 7. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard Way to Fight 
a Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521 passim (1990) (describing President Reagan’s broad 
deregulatory efforts, which began immediately upon Reagan assuming office).  
 8. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321–22.  
 9. Consider that, where there is potential for either state or federal regulation, pure exit 
requires both state and federal regulators to exit (quadrant 1, below). Outside of this possibility, 
if the federal government retains regulatory power but the states fully exit, there would seem to 
be a strong possibility for unitary regulation, as may occur through federal preemption (quadrant 
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Lessons from the energy sector suggest that often, “regulatory exit” is 
better characterized as a form of constrained exit that we call 
“hydraulic regulatory exchange.” This exchange is a regulatory or 
policy change at a federal, state, or other governmental level in 
response to partial deregulation or other modifications of the 
regulatory status quo. We identify two distinct forms of exchange: first, 
intra-agency exchange, in which an agency augments certain 
deregulatory efforts with regulations aimed at other activities in order 
to meet its statutory duties, and second, intergovernmental exchange, in 
which governments at other levels respond to federal exit with 
regulations that emulate the federal exit response but sometimes differ 
from it, or that compete with the federal approach. Importantly, within 
this exchange of regulations or institutions, “exit” is rarely the 
reduction or elimination of regulation in a regulatory area. Rather, it 
involves a federal agency, state, or other institution changing its 
regulatory approach or opting out of one type of regulation, while 
simultaneously increasing regulation elsewhere in order to achieve a 
policy goal. 
These types of exchange—in which only partial deregulation or 
even a net expansion of regulation occurs—result from two factors that 
constrain the classic exit case defined by Ruhl and Salzman. Federal 
statutes tend to create duties that agencies may not abandon through 
exit, thus sometimes requiring offsetting protective regulation. 
Additionally, these statutes sometimes divide authority in a particular 
regulatory area between federal and sub-federal institutions, thus 
making intergovernmental regulatory exchange likely. The Federal 
Power Act (FPA)—the enabling statute of the Federal Energy 
 
2, below). Where states remain but the federal government exits, there is state regulation 
(quadrant 3, below). This Article argues that the Federal Power Act (FPA) largely operates in 
quadrant 4, containing those situations in which the federal and state governments both retain 
some regulatory authority—a relationship we generally describe as “cooperative federalism.” 
This Article’s use of cooperative federalism is distinct from the more narrowly defined use of the 
term, which refers to states implementing federal mandates under acts such as the Clean Air Act. 
This Article aims to provide an account of the dynamic interaction that occurs as the federal 
government moves toward exit in the cooperative federalism context—as a way of mediating 
exchange between the state and federal spheres, rather than forcing federal or state regulators to 
move into other quadrants.  
Table 1.  
 Feds Full Exit  Feds Remain  
States Fully Exit  (1) Pure Exit  (2) Unitary Preemption  
States Remain (3) State Regulation  (4) Cooperative Federalism 
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Regulatory Commission (FERC)—provides a classic example of both 
of these factors. FERC’s primary duty under the FPA is to ensure that 
rates are “just and reasonable,”10 thus facilitating intra-agency 
regulatory exchange and making full exit unlikely. Further, the FPA 
increases the likelihood of intergovernmental exchange if any federal 
exit occurs; it tasks FERC with regulating wholesale sales (power sales 
between two different utilities or between generators and utilities) and 
the transmission of wholesale electricity,11 while it specifically reserves 
to the states authority over generation and retail electricity (sales from 
utilities directly to customers).12 FERC’s efforts under the FPA to 
better serve consumers by enhancing competition in the electricity 
sector powerfully demonstrate both forms of exchange. 
Beginning in the 1990s, FERC initiated a broad project to undo 
conventional delivery of electric power by vertically integrated utilities 
that operated as franchises free from competition and subject to 
regulated rates.13 The “exit” that occurred in this case was exit from a 
particular type of regulation (traditional rate regulation). FERC 
decided that its duty of ensuring just and reasonable rates would be 
better achieved by encouraging competition in electricity generation, 
thus exiting the regulation of wholesale rates.14 At the same time, 
 
 10. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). The phrase “just and reasonable” refers to both protecting 
consumers from excessive rates but also protecting utilities from exceedingly low rates that would 
prevent utilities from recovering the costs they incur in fulfilling obligations to customers. See 
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (noting that to be just 
and reasonable, utility rates must involve “balancing of the investor and the consumer interests”); 
Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 693 
(1923) (noting that under the “just and reasonable” standard, the financial return to the utility 
under the rates it is allowed to charge “should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the 
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical 
management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the 
proper discharge of its public duties”).  
 11. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (indicating that “[t]he provisions of this subchapter shall apply to 
the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce”).  
 12. See id. (providing that the commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used 
for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the 
transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” as well as certain other transmission).  
 13. See FERC Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by 
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 
18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Order No. 888] (“Today the Commission issues three final, 
interrelated rules designed to remove impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power 
marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity 
consumers.”).  
 14. See infra notes 15–16. 
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FERC enhanced regulation in the transmission area, forcing the 
opening up of transmission lines, which often served as bottlenecks 
preventing access to cheap wholesale generators.15 
FERC’s new approach removed the commission from detailed 
oversight of power supply investment decisions, enhanced the 
commission’s role in regulating transmission, and created a 
competitive interstate energy market.16 During this transition, 
intergovernmental regulatory exchange also occurred, in part because 
FERC pressured states—which share authority with FERC under the 
FPA and regulate retail electricity markets—to deregulate or open up 
portions of these markets.17 When this regulatory restructuring took off 
in earnest, a significant number of states whose customers were saddled 
with high-cost and obsolete power generation assets followed FERC’s 
restructuring lead.18 But the state regulatory response tended to 
entrench distinct regulatory approaches—some of which emulated 
FERC’s lead, and others of which differed substantially from it. In an 
example of a state emulating partial federal exit,19 California required 
utilities to acquire all of their power through a competitive 
marketplace but failed to implement adequate protections against 
 
 15. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,543 (concluding that its rule requiring enhanced 
access to transmission lines and associated approval of more competitive wholesale rates for 
generators that could show a lack of market power would “remedy undue discrimination in 
transmission services in interstate commerce and provide an orderly and fair transition to 
competitive bulk power markets”).  
 16. See FERC Order No. 816, Refinements to Policies and Procedures for Market-Based 
Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 
80 Fed. Reg. 67,056, 67,057 (Oct. 30, 2015) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 
816] (describing the Commission’s history of approving market-based rates in lieu of regulated 
cost-of-service rates).  
 17. Much of the pressure from FERC involved encouraging utilities within states—which 
tend to generate and transmit both wholesale and retail electric power—to hand over operational 
control of their transmission lines to regional entities called independent system operators or 
regional transmission organizations. These regional entities, once formed would run competitive 
wholesale markets for the electricity flowing through the lines and would generally allow both 
retail and wholesale electricity customers to access more generators because these generators 
would have broader geographic options for transmission and selling electricity. See, e.g., FERC 
Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 831 (Jan. 6, 2000) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 2000] (encouraging the formation of regional 
transmission organizations); Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,542 (encouraging the formation 
of independent system operators). 
 18. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 
RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY AS OF FEBRUARY 2003, at 1–2 (2003), https://www.eia.gov/ 
electricity/policies/legislation/california/pdf/restructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR4B-Q5SB].  
 19. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321–22 (describing pricing problems in the California 
marketplace). 
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gaming of the system, leading to unusually high wholesale (and retail) 
electricity prices.20 
Additionally, as FERC has partially exited the sphere of electricity 
regulation, stakeholders have looked to regional, state, and local 
institutions to address important consumer protection, reliability, and 
environmental goals.21 In this sense, the shifting demand for new forms 
of regulation expands and contracts as regulatory exit at the federal 
level changes. This has forced federal and state regulators to engage in 
an ongoing exchange of jurisdictional control, with FERC 
acknowledging state control of activities related to retail electricity 
sales and other activities while zealously protecting its jurisdictional 
authority over other areas. For example, with wholesale electricity 
competition already underway, FERC attempted to further encourage 
competition by permitting the “non-use” of electricity to be bid into 
markets in lieu of expensive generation during times of peak electricity 
demand;22 in doing so, FERC allowed states to opt out or “veto” this 
federally created market by prohibiting retail users of electricity users 
from bidding their non-use into federal markets. Additionally, some 
states have maintained traditional regulation of their retail electricity 
sectors to control retail prices and prevent large fluctuations, in part 
out of a concern that problems similar to those seen in California could 
arise.23 This kind of exchange has been enabled by a statutory 
framework that was designed to fill regulatory gaps, and that expressly 
preserves a role for states.24 
The fact that exit is constrained by statutes and often causes 
regulatory responses at the federal level or at other levels of 
government—particularly under statutes colored by federalism 
undertones—calls for a broader understanding of even more 
 
 20. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. Dynegy Power Mktg., 384 F.3d 756, 759 
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[i]n the markets the PX [Power Exchange] and ISO [Independent 
System Operator] managed, rates for wholesale electricity rose dramatically during 2000 and 
2001,” and noting alleged gaming of the markets). 
 21. See, e.g., Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17 CV 1163 & 17 CV 1164, 2017 WL 
3008289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017) (addressing the zero-emission credit program in Illinois).  
 22. FERC Order 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 
73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,119 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 23. Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, The Brattle Group, Electricity Market Restructuring: Where 
Are We Now? Presentation to the National Conference of State Legislatures Energy Policy 
Forum (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/Energy_Pfeifenberger_ 
Johannes_present.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HVB-WHBE] (noting that “[o]nly 15 states fully 
restructured their retail electricity markets”).  
 24. See infra Part II.  
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complicated exit strategies than Ruhl and Salzman anticipated in their 
initial analysis of exit. A close look at the examples from the exit 
literature’s typology reveals that pure regulatory exit may be more of 
a theory than a reality, and that what this Article describes as 
constrained exit in the form of regulatory exchange is a far more 
common and potentially feasible approach, at least in the energy 
sector. This Article argues that regulatory exit strategies need to 
anticipate and facilitate the two forms of hydraulic regulatory exchange 
we identify. Specifically, in planning for exit a federal agency needs to 
map out a vision for the future and also needs to ensure that it is able 
to preserve statutory obligations (typically through intra-agency 
regulatory exchange) and navigate complex, often unpredictable 
responses from other levels of government in the form of 
intergovernmental exchange. Proactive planning for hydraulic 
regulatory exchange is important to create more effective responses to 
regulatory gaps, to mediate conflicts among agencies with overlapping 
responsibilities in the regulatory area, and to ensure that agencies 
maintain statutory responsibilities when exiting a regulatory area. 
Hydraulic regulatory exchange not only responds to private 
stakeholders, who bargain between regulators, but can provide various 
forms of insurance against future regulatory change as well. As law and 
psychology would suggest, individual officials have an incentive to 
preserve at least part of their role even when pursuing certain forms of 
exit,25 and where there is greater potential for jurisdictional overlap, we 
would expect regulators to hold on to the option to reverse exit. 
Regulated industries, too, will want to preserve options to undo exit 
where there is a threat of undetermined forms of new regulation in the 
future.26 It is therefore important that exit strategies incorporate and 
facilitate exchange, with an aim toward striking a balance between 
certainty and flexibility. 
In arguing for a nuanced definition of exit that includes regulatory 
exchange and proposing ways to better navigate this exchange, this 
Article highlights two aspects of exit that are sometimes absent from 
 
 25. See Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 1441; see also, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: 
A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 259–67 (2009) 
(describing agency staff members’ and agency heads’ incentives).  
 26. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of 
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 
(1985) (noting that although industry groups would have preferred no regulation in certain areas, 
they pushed for federal environmental law as an alternative to somewhat unpredictable, varied, 
and strict state laws).  
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“pure exit” conversations: that regulators are nearly always 
constrained by statutes when exiting, and that other regulatory entities 
often fill spaces created by partial exit or make similar or conflicting 
regulatory changes within their own jurisdictional spheres. 
Part I introduces conventional regulation of interstate energy 
markets. In Part II, the Article describes FERC’s efforts to exit 
portions of the field of wholesale electricity regulation through 
restructuring and the constraints on exit created by the FPA—
constraints that lead to intra-agency and intergovernmental exchange 
rather than classic exit. Part III then explores how competitive energy 
markets have opened up hydraulic forms of regulatory exchange as 
states work to address changing public needs, such as demands to 
address climate change. It analyzes FERC’s allowance for state veto as 
one form of managing and proactively planning for hydraulic 
exchange. Part III also discusses the ongoing ambiguity surrounding 
state exit from interstate energy markets—a form of reactive exit that 
must be monitored to ensure that it does not entrench new forms of 
market power. 
Part IV highlights how the need for regulatory exit strategies to 
address and facilitate exchange will increase with greater overlap of the 
missions of different regulatory institutions. This may produce greater 
demand for approaches to exit that manage hydraulic regulatory 
exchange, including efforts to give more of a voice to states or other 
institutions. However, we warn, these efforts must be approached 
carefully to avoid the creation of new dysfunctions. 
I.  TRADITIONAL REGULATION OF INTERSTATE ENERGY MARKETS 
Upon first glance, FERC’s regulatory and deregulatory strategies 
to expand competition in the electricity sector (“electricity 
restructuring”) over the past three decades are a classic “exit” story, in 
that the commission in many respects attempted to extricate itself from 
regulatory intervention to encourage competition in the provision of 
electricity. FERC in many senses did not exit the regulatory sphere, 
however. Indeed, FERC had to issue new regulations to ensure that 
markets would, in fact, be competitive. Thus, the energy law story 
differs from the types of exit described within Professors Ruhl and 
Salzman’s pathbreaking work on regulatory exit,27 and, we argue, is 
 
 27. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1302 (defining exit in terms of reduced governmental 
intervention).  
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better categorized as regulatory exchange. The energy regulatory 
exchange story is also notable because Congress did not appear to 
intend for any form of exit in the energy enabling statutes, thus creating 
complications for FERC’s exit strategies. 
Congress enacted the FPA—the statute that creates broad federal 
authority over electricity generation and transmission—in response to 
concerns about a regulatory gap created by the Supreme Court in the 
Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam Company case.28 In 
holding that states could not regulate wholesale rates charged by a 
utility in another state, the Court in Attleboro created a space that 
could not legally be filled through state action and that the federal 
government had not yet addressed.29 Thus, Congress enacted the FPA 
to occupy this previously “unregulated” area. The FPA contains broad 
jurisdictional language mandating federal involvement in interstate 
electricity transactions. In its declaration of policy, Congress 
emphasized that federal regulation of interstate wholesale electricity 
sales was “necessary in the public interest.”30 And the substantive 
portions of the FPA extended federal authority to both the 
transmission and wholesale sale of interstate electricity.31 At the same 
time, Congress expanded federal involvement in this area through 
other statutes in an effort to further protect the public from 
anticompetitive activity in the area of wholesale electricity. For 
example, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) 
required many utilities to register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and obtain SEC approval before issuing securities 
or acquiring other generators and power companies, among other 
measures.32 
In carrying out its FPA duties, FERC came to be heavily involved 
in the regulation of wholesale electricity sales and transmission. Any 
 
 28. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927). 
 29. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002) (noting that “[i]t is clear that the enactment of 
the FPA in 1935 closed the ‘Attleboro gap’ by authorizing federal regulation of interstate, 
wholesale sales of electricity” but emphasizing that the FPA was more than a gap-filling statute 
because it also extended federal jurisdiction into areas previously regulated by states and 
provided for federal jurisdiction over areas not at issue in Attleboro, including electricity 
transmission); Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 90 (holding that states could not regulate rates charged for 
the sale of wholesale electricity from a utility in one state to a utility in another state).  
 30. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).  
 31. Id. § 824(b). 
 32. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, §§ 5, 6, 9, 49 Stat. 803, 
812–15, 817–18 (repealed and replaced by the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 as part 
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 974). 
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electric utility proposing to sell electricity wholesale had to first obtain 
FERC approval of the rate to be charged. For most of the twentieth 
century, this endeavor required a lengthy “cost-of-service” rate-
making proceeding in which FERC assessed the capital and operating 
costs for each utility (including the utility’s need to provide returns to 
shareholders), establishing a just and reasonable rate based on this 
detailed information.33 Similarly, each owner and operator of an 
electric transmission line over which FERC had jurisdiction had to 
obtain FERC approval of the rates to be charged for other utilities’ use 
of the line and approval of the terms of service that would be offered 
to these utilities.34 Users of those transmission lines had to grapple with 
numerous rates if they sent electricity over lines owned by different 
utilities.35 And under PUHCA, the SEC had to give the green light to 
most utility stock offerings and mergers, among other transactions.36 
Over time, it became increasingly apparent to Congress and 
FERC that guarding the “public interest”—that is, protecting 
electricity consumers from unreasonable rates and anticompetitive 
practices, and also preserving reasonable profits for utilities37—would 
require more than the oversight of rates and business transactions and 
might necessitate certain forms of exit to allow positive market forces 
to prevail.38 Utilities continued to exercise monopolistic power over 
electricity markets by favoring incumbent power plants over new 
entrants jealously guarding use of their own transmission lines—thus 
 
 33. See Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale 
Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 3 (2017).  
 34. See, e.g., Robert J. Michaels, The Governance of Transmission Operators, 20 ENERGY 
L.J. 233, 235 (1999) (noting that “[t]hrough the 1970s” transmission was “supplied largely at the 
discretion of its owners at cost-recovering rates”).  
 35. David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
765, 773 n.43 (2008) (“[E]ach of many owners [of the transmission grid] demanded a separate rate 
from customers for the transmission of electricity along each segment of the grid (so-called 
‘pancaking’ of rates).”).  
 36. See James W. Moeller, Toward an SEC-FERC Memorandum of Understanding, 15 
ENERGY L.J. 31, 46 (1994) (noting, prior to the repeal of PUHCA, that “it [was] unlawful under 
section 9(a)(1) [of PUHCA] for registered public utility holding companies and their public utility 
(or non-utility) subsidiaries to acquire the securities or assets of another electric public utility 
without SEC approval”).  
 37. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 38. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,540–46 (noting rising prices of electricity 
produced under the old, fully-regulated system, in which FERC approved rates designed to allow 
utilities to recover the costs of investments such as expensive nuclear power plants, and noting 
the need to move to a more competitive model); id. at 21,550 (noting the agency’s “traditional 
obligation to ensure that utilities have a fair opportunity to recover prudently incurred costs and 
that they maintain power supply reliability”).  
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preventing competitors from accessing these utilities’ wholesale 
customers—and refusing to build new transmission lines that would 
facilitate more competitor access.39 In response to these and other 
practices, which were challenged by wholesale buyers, the Supreme 
Court made clear that electric utilities are not immune from antitrust 
law and from the competitive pressures associated with this law.40 
Congress, too, began to shift its focus from FPA-style regulatory 
intervention to statutes designed to protect consumers through 
enhanced competition in wholesale electricity. For example, Congress 
exempted certain utilities from PUHCA if these utilities could show 
that they were wholly in the business of generating electricity;41 this had 
the effect of encouraging independent, competitive generators to enter 
the market, thus helping to lower prices. Congress also encouraged 
small generators to enter the market by requiring that utilities purchase 
power from these generators and pay them a particular rate for the 
power.42 And Congress gave FERC the power to order a utility to grant 
competing utilities access to the utility’s transmission lines in order to 
sell to a third-party buyer—a practice called wheeling.43 Thus, although 
governmental involvement in the energy sphere continued, its aim was 
to enhance the power of markets and reduce the need for direct 
regulation of electricity rates. 
FERC also began to expand its efforts to weaken utilities’ 
anticompetitive powers. At first, FERC engaged in case-by-case efforts 
to encourage competition. For example, it accepted and increasingly 
granted applications for wholesale electricity sellers to sell power at 
market-based rates,44 meaning that FERC would no longer cap the 
 
 39. See id. at 21,547 (concluding that previous efforts to open up transmission were 
inadequate to address remaining “undue discrimination” in terms of transmission pricing and 
access and noting “the problem of the disparity in transmission service that utilities provided to 
third parties in comparison to their own uses of the transmission system”); id. at 21,546 (noting 
that “[t]he most likely route to market power in today’s electric utility industry lies through 
ownership or control of transmission facilities”).  
 40. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973) (subjecting a refusal to 
deal allegation related to transmission lines to antitrust law scrutiny).  
 41. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,546–47 (describing the creation of exempt 
wholesale generators (EWGs) through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the purposes behind 
it).  
 42. Id. at 21,545 (describing the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and its intent of 
promoting competition). 
 43. Id. at 21,547 (noting the Energy Policy Act’s amendment to the FPA to allow FERC to 
issue individualized wheeling orders, and noting FERC’s use of this authority).  
 44. See FERC Order No. 697, Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, 
Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,904, 39,907 (July 20, 2007) 
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price of electricity and would allow the seller to charge any price the 
market would bear, subject to FERC monitoring for potential market 
power problems.45 FERC also used its congressionally granted power 
to issue individual wheeling orders.46 
FERC quickly moved toward broad-based reform in an effort to 
harness competitive market powers, and this effort demonstrated how 
FERC’s “exit” story was in fact dominated by regulatory exchange—
in this case, intra-agency exchange in the form of deregulating one 
regulatory sphere while enhancing regulation in another. When FERC 
issued a broad-based policy to allow most wholesale rates to be 
competitive rates—primarily contained within FERC Orders 697 and 
81647—this extricated the commission from its formal case-by-case 
approval of rates. But FERC had first issued a sweeping regulatory 
directive in 1996 called FERC Order 888 that required universal 
wheeling, meaning that all utilities had to offer open access to their 
transmission lines (within practical limits).48 Without this enhanced 
federal regulatory involvement in the transmission sector, efforts to 
deregulate rates and allow competitive forces to protect electricity 
consumers would have backfired because competitive generators of 
electricity would have lacked access to transmission lines, which are 
too expensive for many generators to build and operate themselves.49 
Despite these ambitious efforts, the following Part discusses how 
FERC’s vision for fostering competitive markets was not fully realized, 
in large measure due to the fact that FERC’s strategy failed to fully 
anticipate private anticompetitive practices that would still harm 
consumers—practices that emerged in restructured markets at both the 
federal and state levels. Further, FERC’s consumer (and utility) 
 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 697] (“In 1988, the Commission began 
considering proposals for market-based pricing of wholesale power sales. The Commission acted 
on market-based rate proposals filed by various wholesale suppliers on a case-by-case basis.”); 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 
2000: AN UPDATE 63 (2000), https://grist.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/update2000.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RX95-9V7W]. 
 45. Sellers still must submit individual applications for market-based rate approval, but 
FERC approves many of these requests and has streamlined applicants’ procedures for proving 
that they lack market power—a prerequisite to obtaining this approval. See Order No. 816, supra 
note 16, at 67,057; Order No. 697, supra note 44, at 39906. 
 46. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 44, at 63.  
 47. See infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.  
 48. Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,541.  
 49. Id. at 21,550 (noting that “[t]ransmitting utilities own the transportation system over 
which bulk power competition occurs and transmission service continues to be a natural 
monopoly”).  
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protection mission50 required any exit from conventional regulation to 
better balance these kinds of goals in its substantive regulatory 
approach. 
II.  REGULATORY EXCHANGE IN RESTRUCTURED ENERGY 
MARKETS 
Viewed in isolation, certain aspects of FERC’s electricity 
restructuring efforts—a combination of deregulation under Order 697 
and 816, and enhanced regulation under Order 888—look like classic 
exit, and more specifically, “adaptive, transparent exit” which is a form 
that the commission did not design ex ante but later adopted as its 
strategy using clear standards.51 But the “exit” involved here was an 
exit from traditionally regulated monopolistic electricity markets, not 
from FERC regulation. FERC’s electricity restructuring was designed 
to facilitate a competitive electric power supply in order to reduce 
electricity prices for consumers while also ensuring that utilities could 
remain financially viable. 
To accomplish this vision of competition, through Orders 697 and 
816 FERC retroactively attempted to expand competition in the 
electricity sector and crafted standards for removing commission 
approval of most wholesale rates.52 Specifically, in Order 697, FERC 
indicated that it would permit wholesale sellers of electricity to charge 
market rates after determining that these sellers lacked market power 
or had market power but had “mitigated it.”53 The commission also 
required, among other things, that the seller continue to file periodic 
reports so that FERC could monitor transactions over time and check 
for possible changes in market power, and the commission reserved the 
power to revoke a seller’s authority to charge market-based rates.54 
Order 816 subsequently streamlined certain aspects of the 
 
 50. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 51. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1322–23.  
 52. See supra notes 44 and 45. 
 53. Order No. 697, supra note 44, at 39,906. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. 
No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 537–38 (2008) (describing FERC’s ongoing authority over certain aspects of 
the rates, noting that before the commission authorizes market-based rates it analyzes “whether 
a market-based rate seller or any of its affiliates has market power in generation or transmission 
and, if so, whether such market power has been mitigated” and listing  the analyses that FERC 
conducts when determining “whether market-based rates should be granted,” including the 
question of whether the proposed “market-based rate seller or any of its affiliates has market 
power”). 
 54. Order No. 697, supra note 44, at 39,906. 
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commission’s analysis regarding sellers’ market power.55 
Importantly, however, FERC’s deregulatory efforts with respect 
to wholesale rates were enabled largely by its enhanced regulatory 
effort under Order 888.56 Through a form of intra-agency exchange 
(deregulation in one area, and enhanced regulation in another), this 
order required all transmission line operators under FERC’s 
jurisdiction to file tariffs with FERC that offered use of their 
transmission lines on an open-access, nondiscriminatory basis—a 
dramatic shift from previous practice.57 FERC believed that when 
more utilities and generators had access to transmission lines, buyers 
would, in turn, have more choices, and electricity rates would decline 
as a result of enhanced competition.58 
States responded in various ways to this effort—mimicking certain 
aspects of rate deregulation at the state level59 or entrenching 
traditional rate regulation.60 FERC’s effort to partially exit electricity 
regulation accordingly tells a far more nuanced story than traditional 
exit, and one that involves both intergovernmental and intra-agency 
exchange. The FPA mandates, or at minimum encourages, both types 
of exchange and therefore constrains what might otherwise be classic 
exit—an overall reduction or elimination of regulation within a 
regulatory field. 
With respect to intergovernmental exchange, the FPA expressly 
reserves room for state regulation; the federal government regulates 
wholesale sales and transmission, and the states regulate retail 
transactions. 61 These seemingly clear jurisdictional dividing lines are 
quite blurry. Beyond the thorny nature of federalism-infused exit, 
FERC’s electricity restructuring efforts, California’s related 
 
 55. Order No. 816, supra note 16, at 67,059.  
 56. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,550 (“Non-discriminatory open access to 
transmission services is critical to the full development of competitive wholesale generation 
markets and the lower consumer prices achievable through such competition.”). 
 57. Id. at 21,541.  
 58. See id. (“The continuing competitive changes in the industry and the prospect of these 
benefits to customers make it imperative that this Commission take the necessary steps within its 
jurisdiction to ensure that all wholesale buyers and sellers of electric energy can obtain non-
discriminatory transmission access . . . .”).  
 59. See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 60. See, e.g., Philip S. Cross, N.C. Defers Retail Wheeling, 133 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 48 (1995) 
(“Finding the state’s electric regulation in excellent condition, and noting a slowdown in the 
movement toward retail wheeling in other states, the North Carolina Utilities Commission (UC) 
has decided against ruling on the issue at this time.”). 
 61. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).  
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restructuring, and similar exit strategies also reveal another, more 
nuanced type of exit in the form of intra-agency exchange. Agencies 
wishing to exit a regulatory field in the classic sense—meaning they 
want to reduce or eliminate regulation within that field—often must 
retain or even enhance certain regulatory authority due to statutory 
constraints. In the case of FERC, the FPA constrains exit by requiring 
FERC to protect the public interest through federal regulation of 
wholesale electricity and transmission.62 
This Part describes the challenges that FERC faced with its 
electricity restructuring initiatives, including jurisdictional disputes and 
ambiguity with respect to the regulatory duties that FERC was 
required to retain under the FPA. These duties could have more 
effectively protected the public from the impacts of exit within a messy 
federalism area, where both states and the federal government largely 
abandoned certain regulation of electricity markets, leaving significant 
gaps that invited anticompetitive pricing in energy and harmed 
consumers. 
A. The Challenges of Navigating Intergovernmental Exchange 
Despite FERC’s combined efforts to accomplish effective and 
efficient electricity restructuring, the commission failed to establish a 
comprehensive model for exit from federal regulation of the power 
supply; in endorsing a competitive power supply market, FERC failed 
to fully anticipate anticompetitive private behaviors. FERC’s orders 
also did not fully address the potential for ongoing federalism tensions 
or define clearly how FERC would continue to exercise its federally 
mandated duties to prevent or respond to problems that arose as a 
result of exit, such as the exorbitant wholesale prices that emerged 
when California deregulated its generation market.63 
FERC was aware of the potential for these tensions and made 
some efforts to address them. For example, recognizing that states—
which have jurisdiction over retail utilities and the construction of 
transmission lines—would likely block the development of a truly 
regional transmission grid that would enable better competition, Order 
888 encouraged the formation of regional transmission organizations 
 
 62. Id.  
 63. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 541 (2008) 
(discussing the exorbitant rates that emerged in California and noting that “[t]he contracts 
between the parties included rates that were very high by historical standards”).  
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as a way of coordinating the transmission grid in competitive markets.64 
Through this system, utilities could opt into regional, organized power 
supply markets.65 Importantly, many parts of the country still lack these 
regional organizations.66 Subsequent FERC orders have mandated 
regional planning for transmission lines,67 but it is not clear how much 
this planning will in fact open up transmission lines to enable truly 
regional, competitive electricity markets. Further, FERC’s electricity 
restructuring initiative did not—and likely could not—address all of 
the difficulties that would subsequently arise in interpreting the line 
between permissible deregulation and FERC’s ongoing regulatory 
duties. 
In many respects, FERC’s restructuring initiative was successful. 
Competition in generation flourished,68 and electricity rates did decline 
in areas of the country where they had been the highest, in part due to 
the enhanced competition promoted by the order.69 But several 
countervailing forces substantially tempered this success. A primary 
hurdle in the effort to protect consumers through the restructuring 
initiative was the strong yet rather vague dual federalist structure 
preserved by the FPA. Although Congress in the FPA carved out a 
relatively broad area of federal authority, it also definitively preserved 
 
 64. Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,667. FERC further encouraged the formation of these 
entities in Order No. 2000. Order No. 2000, supra note 17, at 831.  
 65. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations in the 
Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 569, 586–87 (2000) (noting “the FERC’s 
consultation with the states that unsurprisingly revealed substantial opposition to RTOs 
[Regional Transmission Organizations]”); Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/ 
Independent Systems Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp [https://perma.cc/TPG7-DAKN] 
(discussing the history of independent system operators and regional transmission organizations). 
 66. For example, most of the southeastern United States operates outside of organized 
regional markets, as does most of the western United States, except California, which has its own 
transmission operator. Regional Transmission Organizations, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N. 
(Nov. 2015), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZQ59-SGAY] (showing geographic locations of RTOs); see also Shelley Welton, Non-
Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 477 (2015) (noting that “RTOs serve 
approximately two-thirds of electricity customers, although their geographic coverage is more 
limited”).  
 67. FERC Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission 
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,845 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 1000].  
 68. See Order No. 2000, supra note 17, at 813 (discussing the expansion of independent 
generation).  
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY xi (2002) (concluding 
that the “U.S. transmission system facilitates wholesale electricity markets that lower consumers’ 
electricity bills by nearly $13 billion annually”).  
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state authority within the energy arena. Specifically, Congress deemed 
federal regulation to protect the public interest a necessity, but in 
granting FERC authority over interstate transmission and wholesale 
sales of electricity Congress also provided that this authority “shall not 
apply to any other sale of electric energy.”70 This and other portions of 
the FPA created a complex federalist scheme, preserving certain 
authority previously held by states but encroaching upon some of their 
regulatory turf. The regulatory regime that emerged impeded FERC’s 
market-based goals and in some cases left substantial regulatory gaps 
that were supposed to have been filled by the FPA. 
Due to the authority reserved to states under the FPA—namely, 
the power to regulate retail sales71—some states effectively blocked 
federal efforts to make electricity generation and transmission truly 
competitive, thus occupying an area that FERC, through its rate and 
transmission-based orders, intended to leave open for competition. For 
example, because states maintained jurisdiction over the siting of 
power plants, the determination of whether a power plant should be 
built, and the retail rates that the plant could charge, states sometimes 
blocked the construction of new competitive generation that would 
have supplied both wholesale and retail customers.72 The exit intended 
by FERC therefore became, against FERC’s wishes, only partial exit, 
creating a market substantially influenced by state forces, many of 
which impeded competition. 
Even in states that embraced competition, problems emerged in 
the form of regulatory gaps. As Ruhl and Salzman note, California—
following FERC’s lead—decided to open up the electricity market for 
both retail and wholesale generation by requiring monopolistic utilities 
to divest their generation infrastructure.73 All generation subsequently 
had to be purchased and sold through a competitive power exchange 
(PX).74 All wholesale power sales occurred through the competitive PX 
market, but as Ruhl and Salzman further observe, utilities purchasing 
 
 70. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).  
 71. The FPA explicitly reserves to states the authority to regulate “any other sale” of energy 
(apart from wholesale sales). Id.  
 72. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (finding that the 
Florida Public Service Commission lacked the authority to approve the construction of a power 
plant for which most power was not “committed” to Florida customers, thus allowing Florida to 
block the construction the type of power plant encouraged by the federal government).  
 73. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321–22; see also Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. 
Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 539 (2008) (describing California’s 
requirements). 
 74. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 539; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321. 
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market-based wholesale power still had to sell retail power at a rate 
capped by the state.75 So when wholesale sellers (now largely 
unregulated by FERC and allowed to charge market rates) 
manipulated PX by, for example, creating artificial power scarcity and 
inducing high wholesale prices, utilities had to purchase expensive 
power and sell it at a low rate. When these utilities attempted to 
remedy the economic harm through lawsuits alleging improper market 
manipulation under state antitrust law, they found themselves trapped 
between a rock and a hard place. Federal courts noted that FERC still 
technically regulated wholesale electricity prices by issuing a permit for 
utilities to sell at market-based rates.76 Thus, although the rates were 
determined by market forces, they were officially approved by a 
federal agency and could not be collaterally challenged through the 
courts.77 Under this rule, called the “filed rate” doctrine,78 the only 
remedy was to engage in FERC proceedings,79 which took years to 
complete and did not allow for full recovery of losses. Ultimately, 
during the disruptive crisis in the California electric power sector, 
FERC failed in its statutory duties to protect the public interest—
particularly in its duty to protect the public from unreasonable 
electricity rates. 
FERC’s electricity restructuring initiative demonstrates both the 
promise and peril of an exit strategy and the failures associated with a 
regulatory exchange approach that lacks a model allowing for checks 
on the inevitable failures that accompany exit. It sheds light on the 
particular federalism challenges that arise when exit occurs within a 
shared regulatory space, and it makes clear that rarely, if ever, will full 
exit occur given agencies’ ongoing statutory duties. The limits of 
electricity restructuring also highlight the need for a proactive strategy 
aimed at anticipating and facilitating hydraulic regulatory exchange—
specifically, the need to foresee how states might fill in openings 
created by federal regulatory transitions, or how the federal 
government might reenter a regulatory space if it identifies market 
 
 75. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1322.  
 76. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor Cty. v. IDACORP, Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 649–51 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (describing FERC’s market-based rates).  
 77. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 761 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“This court has rejected Snohomish’s argument that the preemption-related 
doctrines at issue do not apply when market-based rates are involved.”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 837–39 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding 
that the claims were governed by ISO tariffs). 
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problems or other challenges. And having anticipated these reactions, 
discrete “offramp” strategies are likely needed.80 These would include 
carefully designed ex ante plans for exit that incorporate ongoing 
regulatory protections against market failure and new regulatory gaps, 
and that also anticipate increased demand for additional regulation by 
the commission, states, or other governments. Such strategies would 
better ensure that exit does not compromise an agency’s statutory 
responsibilities, as discussed in the following Section. 
B. Difficulties Fulfilling Statutory Duties in the Transition to Markets 
The limitations of FERC’s electricity restructuring efforts suggest 
that, if FERC is to avoid creating new regulatory gaps, it needs a 
clearer, more proactive strategy in approaching its exit from traditional 
energy regulation. Given the FPA’s continued requirement for an 
assurance of “just and reasonable” rates (previously met through cost-
of-service regulation),81 FERC’s modern market approach must ensure 
that, in pursuing competitive markets through market-based rates, it 
does not fall short of its responsibilities to ratepayers. It is likely 
impossible for an agency to fully predict the pitfalls it will encounter 
when exiting a particular form of regulation (in this case, conventional 
rate regulation) and the specific backup authority it must retain to 
prevent and respond to those pitfalls. These predictive difficulties 
necessitate a sort of “bottom-up” approach that relies on checks and 
balances at other levels of government as well as intra-agency exchange 
to serve as backup insurance in the case of failure. But as this Part 
discusses, certain problems can be addressed up front to balance exit 
strategies with statutory duties, and under FERC’s electricity 
restructuring initiative, FERC did not plan for these contingencies as 
much as it could have. 
One of the clearest examples of the challenges of balancing exit 
and ongoing regulatory duties arose in the context of wholesale 
contracts for electricity, as addressed by the Supreme Court in Morgan 
 
 80. The roadmaps that we propose later in this Article are different from the mapped exit 
strategies defined by Ruhl and Salzman, in which the government identifies particular thresholds 
at which parties will or will not be subject to regulation. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1316–
19. We envision a more comprehensive plan that would define the ongoing role of regulatory 
agencies at several levels of government and incorporate clearer consideration of federal 
agencies’ oversight responsibilities under federal statutes—responsibilities from which exit is not 
an option.  
 81. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). See supra note 10 for a description of the meaning of “just 
and reasonable” rates.  
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Stanley Capital Group v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish 
County.82 When FERC attempted to enhance competition in 
generation prices by abandoning cost-of-service ratemaking for most 
wholesale sales, the commission retained certain protective strategies. 
For example, FERC still required each power marketer or generator 
to obtain FERC approval to charge market-based rates,83 thus ensuring 
ex ante review of potential anticompetitive problems. But for entities 
that entered into private long-term contracts to sell power—contracts 
called power purchase agreements (PPAs)—FERC’s role was minimal. 
A longstanding doctrine developed by the Supreme Court required 
that FERC presume that these “freely negotiated” rates were just and 
reasonable under the FPA.84 Challengers of wholesale rates contained 
within these contracts could only overcome the presumption by 
proving to FERC “that the contract seriously harm[ed] the public 
interest.”85 
Some PPAs negotiated during the California restructuring crisis 
contained unusually high rates—largely because the alternative rates 
available through the power exchange were even higher.86 These PPAs 
locked power purchasers into these rates for long periods, and the 
purchasers challenged the rates as unjust and unreasonable, arguing 
that the presumption should not apply to these PPAs.87 FERC 
disagreed and refused to allow contract modification, but the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the purchasers, finding that the presumption 
should not apply because FERC was unable to review the PPAs just 
after they had been agreed to, and accordingly had lacked the 
opportunity to determine that the prices in the contracts were not just 
and reasonable due to “market dysfunctions.”88 Further, the lower 
court concluded that even if the presumption did apply, when 
purchasers—as opposed to sellers—of electricity challenge the prices, 
the presumption of just and reasonable rates is easier to overcome.89 
The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning but granted the 
 
 82. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527 
(2008).  
 83. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). 
 84. This is known as the “Mobile-Sierra” doctrine. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530 
(referencing United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956)).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 539–41 (addressing problems in the spot market).  
 87. Id. at 541.  
 88. Id. at 543–44.  
 89. Id. 
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purchasers relief on other grounds; in reviewing the contracts’ impact 
on the public interest, FERC had looked only to whether the prices 
imposed an excessive burden at the time they went into effect, as 
opposed to “down the line”—later time periods during which the 
contract prices, as compared to other prices, looked excessive.90 The 
Court concluded that FERC should have considered “the disparity 
between the contract rate and the rates consumers would have paid 
(but for the contracts) further down the line, when the open market 
was no longer dysfunctional.”91 Further, the Court reasoned that if 
generators and power marketers were able to lock in a high contract 
rate for wholesale power as a result of unlawful activity—that is, if 
there was a direct causal connection between unlawful activity such as 
market manipulation and the price—then the presumption is 
inapplicable to that contract.92 
FERC’s failure to address these sorts of problems ex ante, and its 
initial denial of power purchasers’ requests for relief in Morgan 
Stanley, demonstrates the problems that arose due to the commission’s 
lack of clearly defined strategies for preserving statutorily mandated 
consumer protections while exiting markets. Although FERC’s effort 
to increase competition in markets was laudable, the commission 
certainly knew that market manipulation was still a threat—as 
evidenced by FERC’s ongoing requirement that it would individually 
review each power marketer’s and generator’s proposal to operate 
under a market-based tariff (in other words, to charge purchasers 
whatever the market would bear).93 But FERC lacked an adequately 
detailed ex ante plan to address unjust and unreasonable rates that 
arose from manipulation of competitive markets and the inevitable 
spillover of these rates into privately negotiated long-term contracts. 
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has still not ruled that FERC’s 
market-based rates are consistent with its mandate under the FPA, 
raising a continuing concern that compliance with the commission’s 
statutory mandate will require it to be vigilant about these kinds of 
consumer protection concerns. 
 
 90. Id. at 552.  
 91. Id. at 553.  
 92. Id. at 554–55.  
 93. Id. at 537 (describing FERC’s requirement of an “initial authorization of a market-based 
tariff” and the accompanying reporting requirements).  
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III.  COMPETITIVE MARKETS, PUBLIC GOODS, AND REGULATORY 
EXCHANGE 
FERC’s efforts to exit conventional rate regulation while also 
hewing to the commission’s ongoing statutory duties produced many 
legal tensions, as explored in Part II. More recently, as states have 
addressed issues such as energy reliability and climate change, a new 
series of conflicts between FERC and the states have emerged. Even 
where FERC has embraced competitive wholesale energy markets, 
these private markets often fail to fully address important public goods, 
such as energy reliability and environmental protections.94 
Stakeholders, including power suppliers, have increasingly sought state 
assistance to advance these public goods.95 In this back-and-forth 
between FERC and the states, regulatory exit is more commonly 
intergovernmental exchange, and it is a complicated game with 
multiple players. FERC’s market initiatives might, at times, seem to 
cede some authority to the states, allowing states to fill in potential 
holes that remain in federal restructuring efforts. Yet sometimes, 
FERC asserts or reasserts ongoing federal authority through the 
courts, in the form of federal preemption, in an attempt to better 
manage intergovernmental exchange. To date, this kind of exchange 
has been reactive, leading to legal conflict and ad hoc, unprincipled 
resolution, typically by courts. However, if federal regulators were 
proactively attentive to hydraulic regulatory exchange in addressing 
monopoly power in modern energy markets, they would be better 
positioned to strike a balance between adaptation and flexibility in 
their exit strategies.96 
 
 94. But see generally Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and 
Environmental Law, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (2017) (explaining how even in instances 
when FERC has not listed environmental goals in describing its initiatives, some initiatives have 
nonetheless had positive environmental results).  
 95. For a discussion of how FERC has sought to address reliability, see generally Hughes v. 
Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). Against the backdrop of federal inaction on 
climate change, states have focused on their own climate change initiatives. See, e.g., Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY 
(Feb. 2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ Renewable-
Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5X4-58RD] (showing state policies requiring 
renewable energy—policies that are often linked to goals associated with reducing carbon 
emissions).  
 96. We do not mean to suggest here that FERC was wholly inattentive to the likelihood that 
its regulatory approach would sometimes bump up against the states or to argue that FERC 
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Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases demonstrate how federal 
regulators’ ad hoc, unprincipled approach to regulatory exchange has 
produced conflicts due to new forms of state regulation, despite 
FERC’s efforts to exit conventional energy rate regulation. These 
disputes show how full exit is not something that FERC can easily 
accomplish, especially where Congress has required that other 
institutional concerns be balanced, as it did in its effort to close the 
Attleboro gap in the FPA.97 
These recent disputes also illustrate how the option of FERC 
creating a wholesale power market that fully preempts state power 
supply choices has failed on its own terms and is plagued by both legal 
and policy difficulties. As regulatory approaches to energy markets 
evolve, FERC and federal courts cannot merely assume that the 
Attleboro gap will be closed by energy markets, as Order 888’s initial 
power market vision may have hoped. FERC’s role as an interstate 
market regulator provides important guidance to state regulators. 
FERC can better promote market clarity and meet its statutory goal of 
mitigating monopolistic abuses in energy markets by defining offramps 
for states to exit competitive wholesale power market spheres—
proactively articulating when, and under what conditions, states may 
pursue their own regulatory objectives outside of the wholesale power 
market. In this sense, the most difficult issues with modern energy 
market exit are not about FERC itself exiting competitive markets, as 
much as they are about FERC allowing states and other institutions to 
make decisions about power supply outside of energy markets. We 
argue that this kind of exit by other institutions is best approached and 
anticipated as a form of hydraulic intergovernmental regulatory 
exchange—a reactive form of exit by others that federal regulators 
must facilitate and manage to ensure that it does not produce new 
forms of market power. 
 
 
 
should have predicted the many conflicts that might arise as it asserted or retracted from certain 
regulatory authority. But we think that greater ex ante attention to some of the most likely 
conflicts—such as states’ desire to regulate generation (including wholesale generation) for 
environmental purposes could have eased some of the conflict that emerged in the courts. For a 
discussion of FERC’s tendency to avoid close consideration of the environmental impacts (or 
justifications) for its policies—including in its policies relating to competitive wholesale rates and 
open access transmission, see Freeman, supra note 94, at 366–71.  
 97. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
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A. The Significance of Providing States and Other Institutions Exit 
Options 
FERC’s experience with demand response illustrates how a 
proactive approach to exit strategies is necessary to avoid new 
regulatory conflicts. Demand response is a practice through which 
consumers of electricity reduce electricity use in response to higher 
electricity prices or other signals, such as a request from a utility to 
reduce demand during periods of peak generation.98 This type of 
management of electricity use can substantially reduce electricity 
prices; for example, if, a utility can structure rates so as to reduce 
customer energy usage during peak times, it may not be as necessary 
to draw on expensive new peak generation to satisfy demand for 
electricity, and demand response provides an energy consumer 
compensation if it can guarantee this type of valuable service.99 
In another approach that expands (rather than contracts) certain 
types of federal regulation, FERC has attempted to further enhance 
competition in wholesale electricity markets—beyond encouraging 
independent generation through the opening up of transmission 
lines—by incentivizing entities to bid demand response resources into 
wholesale electricity markets. For example, companies called 
“aggregators” can approach numerous electricity consumers and 
persuade them to agree to reduce their electricity use when called upon 
to do so; an aggregator can bid this demand response resource into 
wholesale electricity markets, creating value by reducing the need for 
certain expensive peak generation within these markets.100 FERC 
incentivized this type of practice through several orders, including 
Order 719, which mandated utilities’ acceptance of demand response 
bids from aggregators, and Order 745, which ensured that demand 
response bidders would be compensated for the valuable services they 
were providing.101 Both orders, however, allowed for a sort of state 
“veto” by permitting states to block consumers from selling demand 
 
 98. See Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: Market Pathways and 
Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 351 (2017). 
 99. See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 771–72 (2016) 
(describing the net benefits test in FERC Order 745 and how it ensures that only demand response 
resources that are cheaper than generation are accepted in energy markets).  
 100. See, e.g., Michael Gallagher, Demand Response Aggregators and the MISO Wholesale 
Markets: A Survey of State Laws, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11065, 11071–72 (2017) 
(noting that “aggregators organize consumers as a group and bid into RTO wholesale markets”). 
 101. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 770–72 (2016) (describing the orders).  
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response resources in FERC-enabled wholesale markets.102 
In 2016, the Supreme Court addressed and reversed a D.C. Circuit 
opinion that vacated Order 745.103 Among other reasons for reversal, 
the court of appeals had determined that FERC’s federal jurisdiction 
under the FPA did not extend to demand response resources, which 
are essential retail resources subject to state jurisdiction.104 The 
Supreme Court disagreed in FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n 
(EPSA),105 concluding that FERC’s jurisdiction over “all rules and 
regulations affecting or pertaining to [wholesale] rates or charges”—
an authority called “affecting” jurisdiction—covered demand response 
resources.106 The Court observed that through Order 745, FERC was 
simply regulating “what takes place on the wholesale market”—
allowing consumers to sell a cost-competitive electricity resource 
within these markets.107 Further, the Court emphasized that the 
markets into which demand response resources are bid are run entirely 
by “[w]holesale market operators,” and that the express aim of FERC’s 
demand response program was to “improve[] the wholesale market,” 
encouraging more competition in lower prices.108 Thus, although 
FERC’s order happened to affect state-regulated retail rates, this did 
not serve as a bar to federal regulation of how demand response 
resources are priced in the wholesale power market.109 
Another central aspect of the Court’s reasoning in EPSA was the 
FPA’s initial purpose of filling the Attleboro gap in which neither state 
nor federal regulators regulated wholesale rates. In recognizing 
FERC’s jurisdiction over demand response, the Court noted that states 
alone would not be permitted by the FPA to regulate demand response 
bids within wholesale markets.110 By contrast, if the Court had followed 
the reasoning of those opposed to Order 745, it would have invalidated 
federal control over these bids, thus creating the very sort of gap that 
the FPA was intended to avoid.111 
A practical consequence of EPSA’s focus on this statutory 
 
 102. Id. at 779–80.  
 103. Id. at 772–73 (reversing Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (2014)). 
 104. Id. at 772.  
 105. Id. at 760. 
 106. Id. at 773–75.  
 107. Id. at 776. 
 108. Id. at 776–77.  
 109. Id. at 776.  
 110. Id. at 780. 
 111. Id. 
WISEMAN & ROSSI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018 3:17 PM 
2018] CONSTRAINED REGULATORY EXIT 1713 
purpose of closing regulatory gaps in the regulation of market power is 
the creation of a relatively flexible regulatory space that recognizes a 
significant sphere of concurrent federal and state authority. In 
affirming FERC’s authority to regulate demand response prices in the 
wholesale market, while also recognizing states’ authority over retail 
aspects of demand response, the Court validated a regime that allows 
the federal government to engage in constrained exit. The Court’s 
decision allowed for considerable reliance on competitive power 
markets, while also acknowledging the need to regulate the markets in 
which this competition occurs; moreover, the Court recognized how 
federal law leaves states considerable leeway to experiment with 
competitive resources like demand response as they make their own 
power supply choices.112 
B. Managing Hydraulic Exchange with State Regulators 
Simply providing states the option to exit the federal system for 
purposes of experimentation—a common trope of federalism—does 
not fully capture the complexities of modern regulation, especially in 
the electric power sector. With cooperative or dynamic federalism 
emerging as a new norm in energy regulation,113 in which concurrent 
spheres of regulation are common, it is important for federal regulators 
to manage forms of state exit in order to ensure that federal energy 
market strategies accommodate state policies aimed at ensuring 
reliable and environmentally responsible approaches to power supply 
and to reduce (and ideally eliminate) dysfunctional conflict. 
One novel strategy FERC has used to help grease the wheels of 
regulatory exchange without entirely relinquishing its authority over 
basic substantive policy issues is the state opt out or policy veto. In 
recognizing FERC’s demand response approach as a “program of 
cooperative federalism,” the Court noted that FERC’s rules “allow[] 
any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from making demand 
response bids in the wholesale market,” thus giving states “the means 
to block whatever ‘effective’ increases in retail rates demand response 
 
 112. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 436–37 
(2016). 
 113. As noted above, we use “cooperative” federalism in a loose sense here. See supra note 9. 
Within the more traditional form of cooperative federalism, such as under the Clean Air Act, 
California is allowed to regulate motor vehicle emissions more stringently than federal standards 
if it receives a “waiver” from the EPA. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate 
Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (2009) (discussing the waiver and other aspects of the 
Clean Air Act).  
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programs might be thought to produce.”114 This “opt out” or “veto” 
option would appear to envision FERC setting basic expectations for 
demand response resources in wholesale markets while still allowing 
state regulators an opportunity to experiment with a wide range of 
complementary approaches to power supply that promote energy 
conservation and also protect retail customers. Because states retain 
authority over retail rates, which are fundamental to retail customer 
demand response, states have been able to pursue a diverse range of 
policy experiments with energy conservation and efficiency. This 
“bottom-up” approach has allowed demand response resources to 
develop while also enabling markets and regulators (both federal and 
state) to learn about the viability of various retail customer demand 
response initiatives. The Court did not reason that the state veto option 
(providing each state its own “offramp” from federal market policies) 
is required by the FPA or necessary to support any federal regulation 
of state barriers to demand response as a practice affecting wholesale 
markets. Still, the Court considered the state veto option an important 
component of FERC’s demand response rules that helped to soften the 
impact of an expansion of federal regulatory authority over demand 
response pricing while also recognizing a continued state role over 
power supply. 
We think that the notion of a state veto over energy resource 
participation in federal power markets is a powerful tool for federal 
regulators in approaching other issues where states are experimenting 
with policies regarding power supply decisions. By permitting retail 
customers, who are subject to state jurisdiction, to essentially 
circumvent state jurisdiction and opt for participation in competitive 
wholesale markets instead—unless a state has prohibited this 
outright—FERC empowered customers themselves to make the 
decision to exit traditional forms of state regulation and to participate 
in new demand response markets. The kind of veto option helped 
mitigate market power and supported state buy-in by allowing states 
to prohibit retail customers from participating in these federally run 
demand response markets, thus choosing to exit FERC’s market 
policies. 
Much of the regulatory veto literature tends to cast a wary eye on 
vetoes as creating holdout problems, and indeed, the veto has some 
important limitations, which are flagged below. However, partial exit 
from a regulatory task—here requiring participation in demand 
 
 114. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779–80. 
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response markets—can allow other institutions (such as states) some 
meaningful input in policies that help to mitigate market power. The 
state veto option over demand response appears to have been a key 
proactive measure taken in FERC’s effort to partially exit regulated 
wholesale markets and further encourage competition in these 
markets. States are often considered to be laboratories of democracy,115 
but federal regulators themselves can learn from the diversity of 
different states’ approaches.116 As important, having some buy-in from 
states as partners can also help federal regulators mediate the 
hydraulics of regulatory exchange in a manner that avoids outright 
preemption and also minimizes the risk of regulatory backlash from 
states. 
This is not the first time that FERC has given states options about 
how they wish to participate in interstate energy markets as a way of 
getting more buy-in from them and learning from their experiments. 
Through an earlier series of orders, FERC incentivized utilities to hand 
over control of their transmission lines to regional organizations,117 and 
most recently, FERC required states and the utilities regulated by 
states to engage in regional planning to address the need for new 
electricity transmission lines.118 In a field like energy law, in which the 
federal government and states operate within a shared, sometimes 
ambiguous, and often contested119 jurisdictional space, incorporating 
these kinds of vetoes into exit from certain forms of regulation can 
serve as the type of compromise that allows for effective partial exit 
with continued, limited federal oversight and state buy-in. 
This veto option powerfully demonstrates the importance of 
FERC’s anticipation of concurrent state regulation in its market 
initiatives. But the FPA’s federalism balance also presents complicated 
new issues not fully addressed by the veto option crafted by FERC—
 
 115. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1351, 1335-37 (2009) (describing this common 
assumption found within court cases and the scholarly literature).  
 116. Cf. Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (describing how the federal government often initiates experiments 
or works with states to carry out experiments and can learn from the diversity of policy 
approaches tried at different governmental levels).  
  117. Order No. 2000, supra note 17, at 831; Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,551.  
 118. Order No. 1000, supra note 67, at 49,845.  
 119. For recent cases debating federal and state authority over electricity regulations, see 
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016), and Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016), along with the ongoing litigation about state policies discussed 
infra.  
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specifically, to what extent can state regulators “exit” or opt out of 
interstate energy markets in ways that promote new forms of 
monopolistic abuses or impede FERC’s goal of enhancing competition 
in energy markets? To what extent can state exit be inconsistent with 
the FPA’s aim of closing the Attleboro gap in the regulation of energy 
markets? 
Without doubt, there are instances where reactive regulatory 
exchange has facilitated continued monopolization of energy supply 
and parochial forms of protectionism, which has likely helped to 
sustain higher electricity prices. For example, in the context of 
transmission planning, though FERC has solicited input from states, 
states still may choose the type of planning process involved and design 
this process. As some commenters have observed, this allows some 
states to essentially avoid regional planning and largely maintain the 
status quo.120 Yet the FPA recognizes that there must be some limit on 
how far a state can go when it wishes to opt out of federal market 
policies aimed at mitigating market power. For example, it would seem 
that no state can outright prohibit a power supplier with market power 
from selling into the wholesale market, as this would encroach on 
FERC’s jurisdiction to mitigate monopolistic abuses in the wholesale 
power market. Some states have come perilously close to this kind of 
encroachment by narrowly construing their jurisdiction over the 
construction of power plants that produce both retail and wholesale 
electricity. For example, Florida’s Supreme Court has held that its 
siting statute, which requires a need finding prior to building a new 
power plant, does not allow the construction of a plant by an out-of-
state developer that would have sold some of its electricity to 
customers in Florida but might have potentially sold additional 
wholesale electricity across state lines.121 Similarly, in the approval of 
new electric power transmission lines, some states favor in-state or 
incumbent utilities in the approval process.122 Perhaps the ultimate 
solution to these problems is for FERC to preempt all protectionist 
state initiatives that promote monopolistic discrimination in wholesale 
power markets.123 However, short of a controversial (and legally 
 
 120. See, e.g., Welton, supra note 66, at 461–62 (noting that regional and local planners are 
only making “vague promises” with respect to certain Order No. 1000 directives).  
 121. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 434 (Fla. 2000).  
 122. Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for 
Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 189–97 (2015).  
 123. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. This approach presents some important 
federalism tradeoffs: It would turn a cooperative federalism program into a unitary preemption 
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questionable) assertion of preemptive authority over all state 
regulation of power generation, the veto option has allowed ambitious 
federal policies that help open up markets to mitigate market power 
and reduce electricity prices without limiting state experimentation. 
Veto likely will offer similar promise in emerging areas of energy law 
such as energy storage, where jurisdictional space is once again quite 
uncertain.124 
Even if states do not exit federal regulatory market power 
mitigation approaches outright, as FERC has transitioned to 
competitive interstate markets, energy industry stakeholders 
increasingly are looking to states and other institutions to provide for 
important public goods that these markets leave unaddressed. At some 
level, these new forms of state intervention may interfere with pricing 
signals in competitive markets, and some calls for preemption of states’ 
reactive exit have focused on whether the incentives or subsidies 
interfere with or impact a wholesale rate.125 However, these state 
initiatives can also help to produce undersupplied public goods and can 
mitigate market power by removing barriers to entry and promoting 
new forms of power supply. In this sense, we think that an 
understanding of exit aimed at mitigating market power in electric 
power supply can help to elucidate why it is important for courts and 
FERC to give states considerable leeway to adopt their own reactive 
forms of exit, rather than preempt them outright, 
The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Marketing126 demonstrates the delicate balance that must be struck as 
stakeholders seek new forms of state regulation as a type of hydraulic 
 
program, moving the federalism approach of the FPA from quadrant 4 to quadrant 2.  
 124. For discussion of regulatory uncertainty in the area of energy storage, see Amy L. Stein, 
Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
697 (2014). FERC recently adopted a new rule designed to incorporate the participation of energy 
storage in wholesale power markets. FERC Order No. 841, Electric Storage Participation in 
Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 
83 Fed. Reg. 9580 (Mar. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). However, as with demand 
response, energy storage policies and incentives will depend heavily on state regulators. See Peter 
Maloney, The Flip Side of FERC’s Landmark Storage Order: A Call for States to Take Action, 
UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-flip-side-of-fercs-landmark-
storage-order-a-call-for-states-to-take-a/518497/ [https://perma.cc/AK8N-JSYT]. 
 125. See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (indicating 
that a previous case makes “clear that States [impermissibly] interfere with FERC’s authority by 
disregarding interstate wholesale rates FERC has deemed just and reasonable”).  
 126. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). New Jersey attempted a 
similar approach, which the Third Circuit invalidated in PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 
F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014). 
WISEMAN & ROSSI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018 3:17 PM 
1718  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1687 
relief (or exit) from FERC-regulated competitive energy markets. 
Hughes held that a Maryland scheme to compensate the construction 
of new natural gas plants to improve customer reliability is preempted 
under the FPA.127 Perceiving the regional market incentives in PJM (a 
regional market in which Maryland utilities voluntarily participate) as 
insufficient to incentivize new construction within its borders, 
Maryland enacted a scheme whereby gas power plant owners would be 
compensated with a fixed revenue stream for capacity that cleared the 
relevant market.128 In other words, compensation was designed to 
provide more revenue for the plant’s owners than they would have 
received in PJM’s capacity market, which FERC had approved.129 
Because Maryland’s auction for new in-state generation interfered 
with FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale sales of 
energy under the FPA, in Hughes the Court upheld a lower court 
determination that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
preempts the Maryland scheme.130 Under the FPA, “FERC has 
approved” the regional “capacity auction as the sole [rate setting] 
mechanism for sales of capacity” in order to mitigate market power in 
the region, and, pursuant to PJM’s auction, FERC “has deemed the 
clearing price per se just and reasonable.”131 Given this comprehensive 
measure to mitigate market power in the capacity market, Maryland 
was thus preempted from adopting a plan for new power generation 
that provided subsidies that, in effect, set a different wholesale price by 
guaranteeing a select power generator a rate through a 20 year-
contract with the state’s incumbent utilities.132 This kind of 
arrangement interfered with FERC’s effort to address market power 
through the capacity market, particularly given that Maryland had 
authorized its utilities to participate in a FERC-approved wholesale 
energy supply market and to price and compensate capacity on this 
basis, rather than in some other manner. 
The Court’s Hughes decision has left many regulators, lawyers, 
and industry stakeholders puzzled.133 At the extreme, litigants 
 
 127. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290. 
 128. Id. at 1293. 
 129. Id. Maryland is one of thirteen states that have authorized their utilities to operate in 
PJM—a regional transmission organization that operates the largest organized wholesale power 
market in the United States. 
 130. Id. at 1299. 
 131. Id. at 1297.  
 132. Id. 
 133. E.g., Emily Hammond, Response, Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC: Energy 
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challenging state initiatives have read Hughes as grounding 
preemption of state initiatives on whether they target or interfere with 
wholesale prices. Hughes may support an expansive view of 
preemption, insofar as the Court noted that states may not tether 
revenues to wholesale market participation or condition payments on 
capacity clearing the relevant capacity market auction.134 However, 
since the Court expressly emphasized the narrowness of its holding,135 
Hughes’ reach also appears to be limited by its facts. The Court was 
particularly careful not to endorse blanket preemption by FERC of all 
state incentives and subsidies based on an idealized competitive 
wholesale power market. It fell short of concluding that every state 
subsidy or incentive for power supply is preempted because it impacts 
or undermines a wholesale energy price. The decision expressly left 
open “the permissibility of various other measures States might employ 
to encourage development of new or clean generation, including tax 
incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned 
generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector.”136 
At its most fundamental level, Hughes would seem to prohibit 
state regulators from adopting investment incentives for power supply 
that directly target federal wholesale power market participation in 
ways that enable an incumbent utility or energy resource to expand its 
market power despite federal mitigation efforts through wholesale 
markets, as the Maryland capacity incentives arguably may have.137 
New state incentives or subsidies for power supply that create market 
power might invite states to bolster incumbent firms or give favorable 
treatment to local resources with market power over out-of-state 
sources. This can lead to distortions in energy price signals. However, 
we do not believe that it is simple distortion of wholesale markets that 
creates a preemption problem under Hughes. Rather, it is state 
intervention that risks undue discrimination associated with monopoly 
power by incumbent power suppliers without any regulatory oversight. 
Consistent with this reading of Hughes, FERC’s initial response to the 
decision indicated some hostility toward state-supported cost recovery 
 
Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-laws-jurisdictional-boundaries-
take-three/ [https://perma.cc/ZG5J-HFHG]. 
 134. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 135. Id. (“Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an 
interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
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for legacy coal or nuclear plants that are no longer competitive in 
regional wholesale power markets operating under rules similar to 
those of PJM in Maryland.138 
The emphasis on whether someone—the federal government or 
the state—is mitigating market power seems important in the Hughes 
context, as states can still opt to not participate in regional energy 
markets and to address market power issues themselves through 
conventional rate regulation. In this sense, states continue to hold a 
stealth exit option of their own—one that allows them to pursue 
reliability goals, like Maryland’s, and other values that wholesale 
markets do not sufficiently price, such as enhancing reliance on low-
carbon power. Traditionally regulated states such as Georgia and 
South Carolina offer significant subsidies for new nuclear and carbon 
capture projects, without running into any preemption challenge under 
federal law; these incentives are not likely to be invalidated on 
preemption grounds because states in the southeastern United States 
do not operate within competitive wholesale markets like PJM, nor 
have they restructured at the retail level.139 Unlike Maryland, 
therefore, these states have retained their full authority to decide what 
values to pursue and compensate, while also continuing to protect 
consumers. Although wholesale costs must be carried forward into 
state rate-making proceedings,140 these states still retain the authority 
to set each utility’s return on investment. Moreover, the wholesale 
costs in these states are not derived from competitive auctions, but 
rather from bilateral contracts.141 In these states, therefore, providing 
compensation for the costs of power project construction does not 
“second-guess” or “disregard[] [an] interstate wholesale rate[] FERC 
has deemed just and reasonable” for purposes of mitigating market 
power.142 Thus, in contrast to the regional capacity market governing 
Maryland utilities that FERC had approved, retail reliability (and the 
need for new power supply capacity) in many other parts of the country 
 
 138. See John Funk, FERC Rejects PUCO-Approved FirstEnergy, AEP Power Deals, PLAIN 
DEALER (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2016/04/ferc_rejects_ 
puco_approval_of.html [https://perma.cc/6AYW-6AYR] (describing FERC’s rejection of 
monthly surcharges aimed at protecting existing coal and nuclear plants from competitive 
markets). 
 139. Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 141, 209 (2016). 
 140. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 961 (1986).  
 141. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 139, at 154. 
 142. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298–99. 
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remains solidly within the wheelhouse of state regulators and is not 
priced in the interstate wholesale market.143 Too broad of a reading of 
Hughes could thus create hydraulic incentives for states to re-regulate 
as they address the social project of grid decarbonization. 
For the remaining two-thirds of the United States, wholesale 
electricity sales occur within organized competitive markets such as 
PJM, which are more comprehensively regulated through FERC’s 
approval and oversight of regional market tariffs.144 In these areas, we 
believe that the application of Hughes to state incentives and policies 
must be approached with attention to the purpose behind the state 
intervention, as well as its impact on market power. Absent any 
effective market price on carbon such as a national carbon tax, regional 
initiatives, including PJM’s capacity market, fail entirely to price the 
carbon attributes of various sources of energy.145 As Justice Ginsburg 
wrote for the Hughes majority, “We reject Maryland’s program only 
because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by 
FERC.”146 This would appear to leave states—even those in organized 
regional markets—considerable flexibility to adopt power supply 
incentives and subsidies that advance other values beyond what is 
reflected in FERC-approved market prices.147 Even if FERC-approved 
regional energy markets envision wholesale prices being set in a certain 
manner, state regulatory measures that aim to promote clean forms of 
power generation—especially those with fewer carbon emissions—
may therefore be able to coexist with FERC’s regulation of wholesale 
power markets, as long as they do not enhance market power. The 
basic preemption concern of Hughes should only really come into to 
 
 143. Even where, as in PJM, capacity markets provide some reliability pricing in the wholesale 
market, it is not clear that they provide a perfect market valuation of reliability values associated 
with different energy resources. The American Public Power Association, for example, has 
highlighted how long-term contracts provide a superior way of promoting reliability in 
comparison to capacity markets, and how capacity markets can result in different reliability 
pricing based on how a state chooses to address its retail market. See Randy Elliott, Staying Power 
of a Bad Idea: Capacity Markets’ Reliability Pricing Mechanism, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Sept. 
8, 2015), http://blog.publicpower.org/sme/?p=761 [https://perma.cc/XM2L-E7LF]. 
 144. See Overview, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/ 
mkt-electric/overview.asp [https://perma.cc/26RU-8RU8] (noting that two-thirds of the nation’s 
electricity load is served by organized regional markets). 
 145. Hammond & Spence, supra note 139, at 174, 212. 
 146. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 147. Id. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also underscored “the importance of protecting the 
States’ ability to contribute, within their regulatory domain, to the Federal Power Act’s goal of 
ensuring a sustainable supply of efficient and price-effective energy.” Id. at 1300 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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play where the state incentives or subsidies are presenting a market 
power problem that facilitate discrimination in bulk power pricing, 
which is within the scope of FERC’s authority to regulate just and 
reasonable pricing.148 
Such a reading of Hughes leaves states considerable space to fill in 
public good gaps that FERC-regulated interstate power markets do not 
address, so long as states do not themselves produce new wholesale 
market power problems. As Hughes reminds us, such efforts cannot be 
motivated by or target a FERC-approved pricing scheme designed to 
mitigate market power in wholesale energy sales, such as the capacity 
market operated by PJM. But to the extent that state regulators adopt 
incentives or subsidies that take aim at legitimate regulatory objectives, 
such as reliability or environmental protection, without targeting 
federal pricing efforts aimed at mitigating market power, state 
regulators are exercising legitimate control over power generation 
policies. It is thus consistent with Hughes’s preemption analysis for 
states to compensate energy resources differently, even through 
subsidies. 
Consistent with this approach, to date federal courts have 
recognized that states retain considerable leeway to pursue their own 
regulatory policies so long as their subsidies do not aim directly at 
wholesale prices. One post-Hughes challenge targeted the N.Y. Public 
Service Commission (NYPSC) Clean Energy Standard, which, among 
other things, compensates upstate merchant nuclear power plants for 
the social cost of carbon that their electricity generation avoids.149 This 
Zero Emission Credit approach provides nuclear plant operators 
payments equivalent to the social cost of carbon (with small 
adjustments) for the first two-year period of the Credit.150 To the extent 
 
 148. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 149. N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD 1 (2016), 
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={44C5D5B8-14C3-
4F32-8399-F5487D6D8FE8} [https://perma.cc/JPH2-RKLF]. In adopting this approach, New 
York regulators rejected earlier proposals that were much more closely tied with wholesale 
revenues. See Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and What 
Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 3, 15–16 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual 
Electricity Federalism]. 
 150. N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 149, at 51. This is a “Zero Emission Credit” 
approach because nuclear power plants do not emit carbon (aside from lifecycle emissions 
associated with mining for and transporting uranium, among other parts of the fuel cycle). See 
NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LIFE CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION 2 (2013), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57187.pdf (describing 
relatively low life-cycle carbon emissions from nuclear energy). By paying these plants for the 
social cost of carbon the state supports the plants monetarily and helps them to stay in business 
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that this approach does not limit wholesale market participation or 
calculate incentives based on the wholesale price of energy, it would 
appear to fall on the “safe” side of Hughes. The NYPSC was careful to 
note that it was not setting a price floor for nuclear power, and that any 
adjustments to prices are for purposes of consumer protection.151 In 
later years, though, there are some price adjustments for wholesale 
energy and capacity market revenues152 that would seem to face 
uncertainty under an expansive reading of Hughes’s preemption 
analysis.153 Despite these legal concerns, a federal district court rejected 
a preemption challenge to the New York Zero Emission Credit, noting 
that the challengers failed to distinguish the program from renewable 
energy credits that FERC had approved under the FPA.154 A challenge 
to a similar Illinois program providing for zero emission credits based 
on carbon price (featuring discounts based on wholesale prices to 
protect consumers) was also rejected on the grounds that it is not 
inconsistent with any existing FERC policy.155 
The ultimate outcome of these disputes surrounding state 
subsidies remains uncertain as the issue is appealed, but we believe that 
evaluating them with respect to their impacts on wholesale market 
power mitigation would leave states considerable, but not unlimited, 
leeway to address grid decarbonization, even in FERC-regulated, 
organized markets. States can exit regional markets entirely to the 
extent that they refuse to participate in coordinated markets and 
continue to set retail rates, though they still must pass through 
reasonable wholesale power purchase costs. Even when a state’s 
utilities participate in FERC-regulated regional markets, under the 
recent readings of Hughes, states could also opt to provide public goods 
that FERC has not priced in its general market policies or in market 
 
despite their high costs relative to alternatives such as natural gas and renewable energy sources. 
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW 
GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018 5, https://www.eia.gov/ 
outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf [http://perma.cc/FUA6-95BK] (showing relatively 
high costs of nuclear energy).  
 151. N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 149, at 139. 
 152. Id. at 51. 
 153. For further analysis, see Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism, supra note 149, at 9. 
 154. Coal. for Competitive Energy, Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, No. 16–CV–8164 (VEC), 2017 
WL 3172866, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (rejecting challenge to New York’s zero emission 
credit program on the grounds that challengers had failed to distinguish the program from 
renewable energy credits, which FERC had approved under the FPA). 
 155. See Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17 CV 1163 & 17 CV 1164, 2017 WL 3008289, at 
*14 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017) (rejecting preemption clause challenge to Illinois zero emission credits 
for nuclear plants on the grounds that there is no conflict with any existing FERC policy). 
WISEMAN & ROSSI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018 3:17 PM 
1724  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1687 
tariffs that it has approved, so long as they do not undermine a FERC’s 
market power mitigation efforts. On this view, it would be permissible 
for these state subsidies to influence wholesale prices to some degree 
(as does every form of state regulation), so long as states neither 
condition the subsidies on a supplier’s participation in wholesale power 
markets, nor base the subsidies solely on a competitive wholesale price 
aimed at mitigating market power. The key inquiry is not whether a 
subsidy merely interferes with a market price in the wholesale market; 
rather, it is whether the subsidy promotes market power in a manner 
that conflicts with federal initiatives to mitigate market power through 
interstate power markets. Ultimately, answering this kind of question 
to favor preemption of a state initiative aimed at power supply would 
require FERC to make a finding that discrimination exists in wholesale 
markets, which will depend on the characteristics of different energy 
resources as well as regional markets. 
With ongoing litigation, there remains uncertainty for states 
wishing to pursue particular policies, including incentives and subsidies 
to promote clean energy. Courts may never be able to eliminate all of 
this uncertainty, as no jurisdictional test can resolve every fact 
scenario.156 Nevertheless, FERC can help to reduce some of the 
uncertainty with its own policies by clarifying which FERC approvals 
are aimed at mitigating market power and also clarifying when the 
commission intends for states to continue to adopt their own initiatives 
to address discrimination in power supply markets. For example, 
FERC could adopt guidelines that identify forms of states’ existing 
market power mitigation approaches or those that, as a policy matter, 
FERC considers most desirable. By providing greater clarity, FERC 
could better anticipate and manage the pressures for regulatory 
exchange as states pursue their own market power mitigation and grid 
decarbonization initiatives through reactive forms of exit from 
wholesale markets. 
FERC could encourage hydraulic regulatory exchange by 
clarifying that wholesale market prices are not the exclusive gauge by 
which state initiatives will be judged. The recent federal district court 
decision rejecting a preemption challenge to Illinois’s incentives for 
zero emission energy resources reasoned that there was no conflict 
with existing FERC policies, even though these might impact 
wholesale prices.157 FERC’s promotion of wholesale markets was 
 
 156. For criticism of court-led preemption approaches, see Rossi, supra note 112. 
 157. Vill. of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289 at *14.  
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designed to mitigate market power in power supply, but because it also 
leaves both power supply decisions and retail rates to states, it is 
important to recognize how the regulatory gaps (first identified in 
Attleboro) that motivated adoption of the FPA abound in modern 
wholesale markets. As with demand response, FERC would appear to 
have a range of options that allows for sharing lanes with state 
regulators as they find new ways to incentivize clean energy resources: 
Namely, it can recognize acceptable forms of state hydraulic 
exchange—perhaps through the option of a policy statement 
identifying permissible forms of state subsidies—while also 
encouraging states to participate in wholesale markets as partners in 
mitigating market power. Absent some proactive approach by FERC, 
however, it would appear that states seeking to address problems not 
priced into wholesale power markets such as climate change continue 
to retain some significant “exit” options of their own—that is, the 
ability to opt out of fully competitive markets envisioned by FERC. 
For example, states substantially influence the types of new generation 
built through renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which require a 
certain percentage or amount of retail electricity to come from 
renewable sources. This sort of mandate for retail generation can 
impact the types of generation built to serve both wholesale and retail 
customers and is unlikely to present any market power problem at 
all.158  
At least in the energy context, exit is not a one-way strategy that 
federal regulators monopolize. Framing state responses as examples of 
hydraulic exchange is important if regulators are to be attentive to the 
potential for regulatory gaps in mitigating market power in wholesale 
power supply markets. Because of the cooperative federalism design 
of the FPA, states and market participants have exit options too, and 
federal regulators need to design their own exit strategies with this 
possibility in mind. 
CONCLUSION 
Our case study of FERC’s effort to exit traditionally regulated 
energy markets shows that, at some level, there are both legal and 
 
 158. RPS affect utility decisions in terms of which type of generation to build in part because 
compliance with RPS is achieved through the generation of a “renewable energy credit” (REC). 
See Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1631 (2015) (noting that 
“[i]ndependent power producers can sell their RECs to utilities to earn a premium on top of their 
income from power sales in the wholesale electricity market”).  
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political economy limits on how far federal regulators can go in exiting 
conventional energy regulation aimed at addressing market power. At 
some basic level, the law requires continued regulatory vigilance over 
pricing arrangements or other initiatives that promote market power, 
so pure exit typically is not a strategy available to federal regulators, 
and intra-agency exchange—in which deregulation in one sphere 
accompanies enhanced regulation in another—is often the norm. 
Moreover, given the complex federalism backdrop of utility regulation, 
which creates another constraint on pure exit, the forms of exit that 
occur in energy law look much more like regulatory exchange, adding 
further nuance to adaptive exit. Federal regulators operating in such a 
context generally cannot exit conventional regulation without 
expecting hydraulic reactions by other institutions that can step in with 
their own substitute initiatives to provide the public goods formerly 
provided through federal regulation. The FPA would appear to allow 
states substantial leeway where FERC is not already regulating an 
activity, but FERC also needs to monitor these reactions to ensure that 
they do not create new forms of market power. 
Unlike the Endangered Species Act—the rich point of departure 
for Ruhl & Salzman’s insightful assessment of regulatory exit—not all 
federal statutes allow agencies leeway to fully exit their traditional 
regulatory missions.159 Cooperative federalism160 statutes such as the 
FPA—which recognize institutions with overlapping regulatory 
authority—may be poor candidates for pure exit, though they may 
allow constrained forms of exit for some regulatory tasks. Study of the 
transition to competitive energy markets as a form of exit also 
underscores the significance of paying attention to hydraulic regulatory 
exchange during regulatory transitions, including efforts to exit 
conventional regulation. As the potential for regulatory overlap 
expands, one agency’s exit strategies will create new pressures for other 
institutions, such as states and regional transmission organizations, to 
intervene. Regulators operating under statutes that recognize shared 
jurisdictional areas therefore need to anticipate and facilitate 
regulatory exchange in their exit strategies, and acknowledge how 
exchange connects to their statutory constraints and regulatory 
objectives. This is not a new problem, and it is certainly not unique to 
 
 159. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1319 (“A rare example among regulatory statutes, 
the very purpose of the [Endangered Species Act] is to put itself out of business by promoting the 
recovery of listed species to the point of justifying delisting.”). 
 160. Again, we use cooperative federalism in the loose sense. See supra note 9. 
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energy law. Professor William Buzbee, for example, has recognized 
how some environmental statutes can create new forms of regulatory 
gaps that are at odds with their goals.161 Complex and overlapping 
jurisdiction may heighten the need for agency initiatives that anticipate 
and facilitate regulatory exchange as a pragmatic solution to better 
manage other institutions. We think that mechanisms such as a veto, 
which engages other institutions (namely states) in federal exit 
initiatives, is one way to help create a balance between entrenchment 
and flexibility in regulatory exchange. And the experience of energy 
regulation with this approach shows some promise in striking such a 
balance—and that, in the context of statutes such as the FPA, which 
are aimed at filling regulatory gaps, addressing or anticipating 
hydraulic regulatory exchange may even be required as a way of 
mitigating market power in energy supply. 
In adopting regulatory exchange strategies, agencies must also be 
mindful of how overlapping regulators can create new market power 
problems. Regulatory exchange might encourage dysfunctional 
behaviors—such as selective disclosure of information or lobbying by 
private entities—and it could lead to protectionism or dysfunctional 
clashes between different regulators. These are certainly risks, though 
a failure to acknowledge exchange in exit strategies increases the risks 
of strategic disclosure, lobbying, or dysfunctional competition for 
regulation. In addition, at some level, giving other institutions too 
much of a voice can be obstructive or could lead to situations in which 
other institutions overwhelmingly reject the approach of federal 
regulators. This is something that might be managed to the extent that 
federal regulators give other institutions a voice through mechanisms 
such as a veto and use this as an information-gathering device that 
allows the federal government to learn from these experiences, 
influencing the course of federal policies in the future. For example, 
FERC has done this with demand response162 and in its approach to 
transmission planning, which requires regional energy market 
operators to take into account state public policy objectives including 
renewable power requirements in planning for new transmission 
facilities.163 In this sense, hydraulic regulatory exchange thus not only 
 
 161. See generally William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003) (focusing on the need for a way to address regulatory 
gaps in environmental enforcement under cooperative federalism statutes).  
 162. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing FERC learning from state demand 
response initiatives).  
 163. FERC Order No. 1000, supra note 67, at 49,845–46 (requiring transmission planning 
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gives a voice to other institutions but produces valuable information 
for federal regulators, as well as markets, that can help in mitigating 
market power. 
Ruhl and Salzman are correct to warn against pure exit as a way 
of dismantling energy regulation and to recommend adaptive exit as a 
strategy for energy markets.164 Ultimately, however, we might question 
whether the regulatory transition in energy markets is a form of exit at 
all. Energy markets were created for an interventionist reason—to 
mitigate market power—and need regulation to succeed. Exit from 
traditional regulation might be justified where it works to mitigate 
market power, but in other contexts exit may not be consistent with the 
goals of modern energy markets. Importantly too, the notion that there 
is a single regulator in modern energy markets is a myth. Exiting one 
evil can readily open up the possibility of another one, including the 
possibilities for new forms of exit that (often unintentionally) increase 
rather than mitigate market power. As federal agencies exit some of 
their traditional regulatory tasks, they must also devise strategies to 
strike a new regulatory balance as stakeholders demand new forms of 
regulation to fill in the void. At bottom, hydraulic regulatory exchange 
in the context of the federal transition to competitive energy markets 
shows how some government decisions that can be described as 
regulatory exit are nothing more than decisions to shuffle primary 
regulatory authority between different institutions who have 
comparative advantages and disadvantages in addressing market 
power in energy supply. Perhaps they should be approached as such. 
 
 
processes that “identify and evaluate transmission needs driven by relevant Public Policy 
Requirements”). 
 164. Ruhl & Salzman, supra 3, at 1321–22. 
